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Pursuant to Rule 26(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellants Pacificorp Electric Operation and Aetna 
Health Plans submit this Reply Brief in response to the arguments 
raised by Appellee Ann Anastasion in her Brief. 
I. RELEVANT FACTS. 
Appellee Ann Anastasion fs Brief sets forth numerous facts 
regarding her subjective intent in making the Offer of Judgment. 
These facts, many of which have absolutely no evidentiary support 
in the record, are not relevant under Utah law in deciding the 
chief issue before this Court: whether there was a binding 
agreement between the parties when Pacificorp and Aetna accepted 
Ann Anastasion!s Offer of Judgment that was hand-served on them and 
did not specify or limit which adverse party could accept it. 
When the proper legal standards and issues are addressed, 
there are relatively few relevant facts in this appeal and they are 
as follows: 
1. Merle Allred initially brought this negligence 
action against Appellee Ann Anastasion for injuries suffered on Ms. 
Anastasion!s property. (Record pp. 2-5). 
2. Appellants Pacificorp Electric Operation and Aetna 
Health Plans were brought into this action by Original Plaintiff's 
amended complaint. (Record pp. 57-60). 
3. Pacificorp Electric Operation and Aetna Health Plans 
became an adverse party to Appellee Ann Anastasion by filing a 
crossclaim for reimbursement of medical expenses they had paid to 
Original Plaintiff as a result of Appellee Ann Anastasionfs 
(hereinafter "Crossclaim Defendant") negligence. (Record pp. 72-
77). Pacificorp Electric Operation and Aetna Health Plans 
(hereinafter collectively "Crossclaim Plaintiffs") also claimed 
interest on this sum, and their costs and attorneys fees. (Record 
pp. 72-77). 
4. On June 30, 1993, Crossclaim Defendant filed a 
motion and memorandum attempting to have Crossclaim Plaintiffs 
dropped from the lawsuit or, in the alternative, to have the 
parties realigned to more accurately reflect Crossclaim Plaintiffs' 
interests as a Plaintiff. (Record pp. 105-110). 
5. On July 27, 1993 Crossclaim Defendant served by 
hand-de1ivery on Crossclaim Plaintiffs a Rule 68(b) offer of 
judgment. (Record pp. 135-138). By its terms, that offer of 
judgment was to be open and available to be accepted for ten days. 
(Record pp. 135-138). 
6. The Offer of Judgment Crossclaim Defendant hand-
served on Crossclaim Plaintiffs provided, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
Pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Defendant Ann Anastasion, by and through her 
attorney, offers to allow judgment to be taken against it 
in the amount of Seventeen Thousand Five Hundred and 
No/100 Dollars ($17,500) together with costs presently 
accrued. 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this offer will remain open and available to 
be accepted for ten (10) days. If not accepted in 
writing within that time period it will be deemed 
rejected and withdrawn and Defendant Ann Anastasion 
intends to introduce it in order to recover costs 
incurred. 
(Record pp. 135-138). 
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7. On July 29, 1993, well within the 10-day acceptance 
period, Crossclaim Plaintiffs accepted Crossclaim Defendants1 Offer 
of Judgment by sending her a Notice of Acceptance of her Offer of 
Judgment. (Record pp. 145-156). Further, in compliance with Utah 
R. Civ. P. 68(b), Crossclaim Plaintiffs filed with the lower court 
both the Offer of Judgment and Notice of Acceptance together with 
proof of service. (Record pp. 135-138, 145-146). All of this was 
done before Crossclaim Defendant made any indication that she had 
any objection to Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 accepting her Offer of 
Judgment. In accordance with Crossclaim Plaintiffs acceptance of 
her Offer of Judgment, the lower court entered judgment against 
Crossclaim Defendant on August 4, 1993. (Record pp. 190-198, 219-
225). 
8. On September 28, 1993 the lower court, upon 
Crossclaim Defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment vacated the 
judgment against Crossclaim Defendant which was based on Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs' acceptance of the Offer of Judgment. (Record pp. 361-
370). The lower court, in making that ruling, did not take any 
testimony or evidence other than a single affidavit by Crossclaim 
Defendant's counsel which is discussed infra at pp. 6-7 and is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
Based on these relevant facts, it is clear that under 
Utah law Crossclaim Plaintiffs had the power to accept Crossclaim 
Defendant's Offer of Judgment and that acceptance created a legally 
binding agreement that should be enforced. 
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II. THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT CROSSCLAIM DEFENDANT'S 
PERSONAL SERVICE VIA HAND-DELIVERY ON CROSSCLAIM 
PLAINTIFFS OF A RULE 68 OFFER OF JUDGMENT THAT NEITHER 
SPECIFIES NOR LIMITS WHO CAN ACCEPT THE OFFER DID NOT 
CREATE THE POWER OF ACCEPTANCE IN CROSSCLAIM PLAINTIFFS 
IS REVIEWED UNDER A CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARD. 
The issue of whether or not a power of acceptance was 
created in Crossclaim Plaintiffs by Crossclaim Defendant's Offer of 
Judgment raises a question of law and the standard of review is a 
correction of error standard.1 E.g., Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. 
Ouintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Whether a contract 
exists between parties is a question of law; therefore, we review 
the trial court's conclusion of law under a correction of error 
standard."); Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Crossclaim Defendant argues that because the lower court 
made "findings of fact" in striking the Crossclaim Plaintiffs' 
acceptance of the Offer of Judgment it somehow changes the nature 
of this Court's standard of review to the abuse of discretion 
standard. That is not the case. Where, as here, the lower court 
makes its determinations based solely upon proffers and pleadings, 
and does not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, the appellate 
court "has as good an opportunity as the trial court to examine the 
evidence and may review the facts de novo." Bench v. Bechtel Civil 
& Minerals, Inc. , 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see also 
Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)(when lower court does not resort to extrinsic 
1
 There is no dispute as to the standards of review 
applicable to the two remaining issues involved in this appeal. 
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evidence the lower court's decision is not afforded any presumption 
of correctness). Additionally, several of the purported "findings 
of fact" are actually conclusions of law and, as such, are accorded 
no deference. For instance, "finding of fact" number two finds 
that the Offer of Judgment was never made nor extended to 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs. That is based solely on the language of the 
actual Offer of Judgment and that construction is a matter of law. 
Likewise number 8, which finds that Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 
subjective belief that the Offer of Judgment was made to them was 
not reasonable, is also a conclusion of law. Numbers 9 and 10 are 
also conclusions of law. Thus, in addition to the findings of fact 
being based solely on pleadings and other evidence (or no evidence 
at all), many of the "findings of fact" are actually conclusions of 
law which are also reviewed under the correction of standard. 
E.g. , Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Ouintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); State in Interest of J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah 
r 
Ct. App. 1994). 
In deciding the first issue on appeal, the lower court 
did not take any testimony or have the opportunity to review the 
credibility of any witnesses. The only "evidence" even arguably 
supporting the lower court's "findings of facts" is the self-
serving, conclusory, after-the-fact affidavit of Crossclaim 
Defendant's own counsel. (See Record pp. 210-212, a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). That affidavit, however, 
clearly does not support findings of fact numbers 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 
5 
and 9, and there is no record evidence which does.2 Thus, this 
Court should look to the pleadings in the record and review the 
lower court's ruling under the correction of error standard. E.g., 
Bench, 758 P.2d at 461; Equitable, 849 P.2d at 1192. 
III. THE CROSSCLAIM PLAINTIFFS1 ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER OF 
JUDGMENT WAS VALID AND BINDING, AND ENFORCEMENT OF THAT 
ACCEPTANCE IS REQUIRED BY THE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE, UTAH 
CONTRACT LAW, AND RULE 68 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
The four arguments Crossclaim Defendant raises against 
enforcement of the judgment based on Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 
acceptance of Crossclaim Defendant's Offer of Judgment are wrong as 
a matter of law, procedure and evidence. Each argument will be 
addressed in turn. 
A. THERE WAS A MEETING OF THE MINDS CREATING A LEGALLY 
BINDING AGREEMENT WHICH THIS COURT SHOULD ENFORCE. 
The first argument raised by the Crossclaim Defendant in 
hopes the Court will not enforce the binding agreement between the 
parties is that there was no meeting of the minds.3 Their 
argument, however, completely ignores Utah law, as set forth fully 
in Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 initial brief, which requires that mutual 
assent be measured by the objective evidence of the parties1 
2
 This also explains the Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 alleged 
failure to marshal the evidence. Given that there is no record 
evidence to support the lower court's findings of fact, there is no 
duty as it would be impossible to marshal evidence which does not 
exist. 
3
 The third argument is very similar to the first in that 
it says Crossclaim Plaintiffs have failed to show there was a 
meeting of the minds. This argument, like the first argument, is 
unavailing because there was a meeting of the minds under Utah law. 
See infra at pp. 7-12. 
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intentions. Under that standard, there is no doubt that there was 
a legally binding agreement this Court should enforce. 
Utah law is clear that it is the objective, expressed 
intention that determines whether there was mutual assent to create 
a legally, binding agreement: 
The apparent mutual assent of the parties, essential to 
the formation of a contract, must be gathered by the 
language employed by them, and the law imputes to a 
person an intention corresponding to the reasonable 
meaning of its words and acts. It judges of his 
intentions by his outward expressions and excludes all 
guestions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his 
words or acts judged by reasonable standards manifests an 
intention to agree to the matter in guestion, that 
agreement is established and it is immaterial what may be 
the real but unexpressed state of his mind upon the 
subject. 
Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group, 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 
1983)(emphases added)(guoting Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 
226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923)). 
Moreover, Crossclaim Defendant's own cases recognize tat 
the extrinsic evidence such as the language of the contract, and 
not some unexpressed reservation or intention, is determinative of 
whether there was a meeting of the minds. E.g., John Call 
Engineering v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987)(in 
determining mutual assent the intention of the parties to a 
contract are controlling and those intentions are usually found in 
the instrument itself); Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 
4
 In fact, Crossclaim Defendant's brief argues the exact 
opposite (i.e., her subjective, unexpressed intent was such that 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs could not accept her offer of judgment and, 
thus, there could be no meeting of the minds). See Brief of 
Appellee at p. 17. Not only is such a statement self-serving and 
conclusory, it is also irrelevant under Utah law as discussed 
below. 
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(Utah 1987) (same); Zions First Nat'l Bank v, Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031, 
1033 (Utah 1977)(language of agreement demonstrates intentions of 
parties). 
The objective evidence showing that there was a mutual 
assent between the parties is extensive and begins with the 
Crossclaim Defendant's Offer of Judgment that was hand-de 1 ivered to 
Crossclaim Plaintiff and provided: 
Pursuant to Rule 68(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Defendant Ann Anastasion, by and through her 
attorney, offers to allow judgment to be taken against it 
in the amount of Seventeen Thousand Five Hundred and 
No/100 Dollars ($17,500) together with costs presently 
accrued. 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this offer will remain open and available to 
be accepted for ten (10) days- If not accepted in 
writing within that time period it will be deemed 
rejected and withdrawn and Defendant Ann Anastasion 
intends to introduce it in order to recover costs 
incurred. 
(Record pp. 135-138). 
An offer such as the foregoing is controlled by the 
express intention of the offeror. See Corbin on Contracts, Section 
11, at 25 (1963). The clear and unexpressed intention of 
Crossclaim Defendants1 Offer of Judgment was to allow Crossclaim 
Plaintiff or Original Plaintiff (upon whom the Offer was also hand-
delivered), or both, to take judgment against her or risk the 
potential of paying the post-offer costs incurred by Crossclaim 
Defendant. The language of the offer, therefore, leads to but one 
conclusion: Crossclaim Defendant's Offer of Judgment was "a 
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to 
justify [Crossclaim Plaintiffs] in understanding that [their] 
8 
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the parties realigned to more accurately reflect [Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs1] interests as a plaintiff." See Brief of Appellee at 
p. 6 and Record pp. 105-110.5 In fact, Crossclaim Defendant has 
had the audacity to claim that Crossclaim Plaintiffs are bound by 
an order directed solely to the Original Plaintiff because of this 
alignment with the Original Plaintiff. See Exhibit "B" attached 
hereto at p. 2. Crossclaim Defendant, thus, clearly recognized at 
the time the Offer of Judgment was made that Crossclaim Plaintiffs 
were an adverse party and, pursuant to Rule 68, Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs had the power and properly accepted Crossclaim 
Defendants1 Offer of Judgment. 
Crossclaim Defendant also attempts to explain away its 
service of the Offer of Judgment on Crossclaim Plaintiffs by hand-
delivery. Although it is true that service is required under Rule 
5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is highly suspect that she 
would choose to personally serve the Offer of Judgment on 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs if she truly in fact did not intend to make 
the offer available to them. More importantly, it certainly 
created the objective appearance that the Offer of Judgment was 
being presented for Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 acceptance. Thus, 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 acceptance of that Offer of Judgment was 
entirely reasonable, appropriate and the judgment resulting 
therefrom should be enforced. 
5
 The Crossclaim Defendant's Brief repeatedly refers to 
this motion as a motion to "dismiss Crossclaim Plaintiff from the 
lawsuit." This is misleading as Crossclaim Defendant was also 
expressly seeking to realign Crossclaim Plaintiffs as a Plaintiff 
to more accurately reflect their interests in this action. 
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 The lower court's purported -j.xndings of fact" also do 
not assist Crossclaim Defendant in this regard. The only finding 
the court made was that the Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 outlays were 
less than the $17,500, it did not address the amounts they may have 
been entitled to as a result of interest, costs and attorneyfs 
fees. 
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contract. Supporting that claim, she cited Ingram v. Forrer, 563 
P.2d 181 (Utah 1987).7 Ingram, however, enforced an agreement 
according to its terms and not the unexpressed agreements or 
intentions of the party. Id. at 182. Here, like in Ingram, the 
express provisions of the offer to contract which was accepted 
defines the terms of the parties1 agreement and that agreement must 
be enforced. 
The strict construction of the offer is particularly 
appropriate where a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment is involved: 
To allow a Rule 68 offeror to inject 
ambiguities into its offer after the fact 
would be tantamount to requiring the offeree 
to guess what meaning a Court will give to the 
terms of that offer before deciding whether to 
accept it or not. . . . Because [the rule 68 
offeree is bound to pay post-offer costs if he 
does not unreservedly accept the offer, ] he is 
entitled to construe the offer's terms 
strictly, and Courts should be reluctant to 
allow the offerorfs extrinsic evidence to 
affect that construction. 
Said v. Virginia Com. Univ./Medical College, 130 F.R.D. 60, 63 
(E.D. Va. 1990)(citations omitted). 
Thus, Crossclaim Defendant's failure to limit the offer to only a 
particular adverse party (which she easily could have done) must be 
construed against her and the ambiguity she created should not be 
7
 Crossclaim Defendant's reliance on Seare v. University of 
Utah School of Med. , 248 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9-10 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) is also misplaced. In Seare, the Court held that appellant 
could not enforce a contract because his unexpressed intentions 
could not constitute a meeting of the minds. While that is true, 
it is the exact opposite to the situation here where Crossclaim 
Defendant incorrectly asserts that her unexpressed intentions 
preclude a meeting of the minds. Moreover, Seare is cited in 
direct violation of Rule 4-508, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, which prohibits the citation to unpublished 
opinions. 
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acceptance in Crossclaim Plaintiffs is entirely consistent with and 
furthers the purposes of Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
IV. THE LOWER COURT'S RULING SETTING ASIDE THE AUGUST 4, 1993 
JUDGMENT WAS ERROR UNDER UTAH LAW AND THAT RULING SHOULD 
BE REVERSED. 
The lower court based its decision to set aside the 
judgment entered against the Crossclaim Defendant on mistake. 
(Record at p. 323, 935-953)^ That decision was manifest error and 
should be reversed. 
The only evidence from which the lower court could derive 
the intent of the Crossclaim Defendant in making her Offer of 
Judgment was the actual offer which, by its terms and the 
applicable procedural rules, created a power of acceptance in 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs. Thus, there is no legal justification for 
setting aside the judgment that was entered based on Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs1 acceptance of the Offer of Judgment. The lower court's 
setting aside of that judgment amounts to an abrogation of the 
contract entered into the parties pursuant to Rule 68, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
The bases for the lower court's setting aside of the 
judgment are nothing more than an after-the-fact attempt to change 
or limit the Offer of Acceptance after it has been accepted. The 
law does not allow this. E.g., Blair v. Shanahan, 795 F.Supp. 309, 
315-316 (N.D.Cal. 1992). As the Blair court noted, the power of 
Rule 68 should not be increased "by allowing an offer that had been 
accepted to be revised to reflect post-acceptance changes in the 
14 
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Original Plaintiff. 
Utah law is clear that where, as here, there are no 
"additional" costs incurred as a result of joining another party, 
any assessed costs should be assessed solely against the original 
opposing party- Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe. 576 P.2d 847, 849 
(Utah 1978). In this case, all of the costs awarded by the lower 
court related solely to claims raised by Original Plaintiff. 
Moreover, some of the costs were incurred even before Crossclaim 
Plaintiffs became parties to this action. Thus, under Utah law, it 
was error for the lower court to fail to assess all costs solely 
against Original Plaintiff and the judgment assessing costs against 
the Crossclaim Plaintiffs should be modified as such. 
VI. CROSSCLAIM PLAINTIFFS APPEAL HAS MERIT AND WAS NOT 
INTERPOSED FOR ANY IMPROPER PURPOSE. 
Crossclaim Defendant's argument that this appeal lacks 
merit or was interposed for some improper purpose is entirely 
untenable. Not only do the Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 briefs clearly 
demonstrate that their position has merit, the Utah Supreme Court 
has denied a Motion for Summary Disposition previously made by 
Crossclaim Defendant on this appeal. There is absolutely no basis 
upon which it could be found that Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 appeal is 
anything but meritorious and proper. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 68(b) the Court, as a matter 
of law, should direct the lower court to reinstate judgment against 
8
 This issue, obviously, becomes moot if the Court rules in 
Crossclaim Plaintiffs1 favor on either of the two other issues. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed, postage prepaid, this |Oth day of 
January, 1995 to the following: 
Steven B. Smith 
SCALLEY & READING 
261 E. 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendants-Crossdefendants 
Ann Anastasion and Shawn Anastasion 
Kelly R. Sheffield 
1364 Emigration Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Counterdefendant 
Merle Lee Allred 
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JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4590 
STEVEN B. SMITH, #5797 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801). 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERLE LEE ALLRED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN B. SMITH 
Civil No. 910906462PI 
ANN ANASTASION and SHAWN 
ANASTASION, Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. : 
Steven B. Smith, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
state of Utah. 
2. I am the attorney for Defendant Ann Anastasion in 
this action. 
3. Numerous attempts have been made by counsel for 
Defendant, Ann Anastasion, and Plaintiff, Merle Lee Allred, to 
negotiate a settlement to this dispute. 
C:\SBS\PLEADING\ANASTAS.MIS 
4. On July 27, 1993, I, as the attorney for Defendant 
Ann Anastasion, prepared, filed and served an Offer of Judgment on 
counsel for Plaintiff Merle Lee Allred in an attempt to fully and 
finally resolve this dispute. 
5. On July 30, 1993, I received a copy of Defendants 
Aetna's and PacifiCorp's acceptance of the Offer of Judgment which 
was submitted for Plaintiff's Merle Lee Allred's acceptance. 
6. Upon receipt of that purported acceptance of 
Defendant Ann Anastasion's Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff Merle Lee 
Allred, I contacted Blake Atkin, the attorney for Aetna and 
PacifiCorp and informed him that the Offer of Judgment had been 
made to Plaintiff and not to PacifiCorp and Aetna and that we would 
refuse to recognize his purported acceptance of the offer of 
Judgment. 
7. On August 4, 1993, I had hand delivered a letter to 
Blake Atkin setting forth our position regarding Defendants 
C:\SBS\PLEA0ING\ANASTAS.HIS 2 
PacifiCorp/s and Aetna's acceptance of Defendant Ann Anastasion's 
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff, Merle Lee Allred. 
DATED this day of August, 1993. 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
<S^x:^/ 
Steven B. Smith 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
August, 1993. 
J w day of 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary P u b l i c V U 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
TERRYJ.NOYD 
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TabB 
JOHN EDWARD HANSEN, #4590 
STEVEN B. SMITH, #5797 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sean Anastasion 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERLE LEE ALLRED, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
ANN ANASTASION, SEAN : 
ANASTASION, PACIFICORP 
ELECTRIC OPERATION AND AETNA : 
HEALTH PLANS 
Defendants. 
SEAN ANASTASION'S RESPONSE TO 
AETNA' S OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 910906462PI 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Sean Anastasion, by and through counsel, hereby submits 
this Response to Aetna's Objections the Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law submitted in conjunction with this Court's 
decision to set aside the Default and Default Judgments entered 
against Sean Anastasion. Throughout this Response Third Party 
Plaintiffs Aetna and Pacificorp are collectively referred to as 
Aetna. 
Aetna claims the Court did not order Sean to be served 
prior to the entry of his Default and the Default Judgment against 
him. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is this Court's Minute Entry 
dated June 15, 1993, which among other things states "PLAINTIFF HAS 
10 DAYS TO FILE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE AGAINST DEFENDANT, SEAN 
ANASTATION [sic] IF HE HAS BEEN SERVED. IF HE HAS NOT BEEN SERVED, 
COUNSEL IS TO SERVE HIM." While the term plaintiff in the forgoing 
quotation could refer only to Merle Allred, counsel's memory and 
the other facts and circumstances indicate the term "plaintiff" in 
the Minute Entry referred to Third Party Plaintiffs Aetna and 
Pacificorp. The fact that Aetna actually served Sean Anastasion 
with its Crossclaim after the Minute Entry supports Sean's 
position. Further support for Sean's position is that Blake Atkin, 
the attorney for Aetna, is identified on the Minute Entry as 
Plaintiff's attorney. Sean Anastasion submits and continues to 
assert that Aetna was ordered to see that Sean was served prior to 
entry of his default and the default judgment against him. 
Sean's response to Aetna's objection to the proposed 
finding of fact 14 rests on the language of the Special Verdict 
filled out by the Jury Foreperson and filed with this Court on 
February 9# 1994. A copy of that Special Verdict is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B." 
Paragraph 3 of that Special Verdict states " [c]onsidering 
all the evidence in this case, do you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the defendant, Sean Anastasion, was negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No " 
2 
In response to the question in paragraph 3 the jury foreperson 
marked "No." While Aetna contends it did not put on its best 
possible case against Sean Anastasion it has neglected to set forth 
with specificity anything different it would have done. Aetna has 
likewise totally ignored the fact that it was totally at fault for 
the improper entry of the Default and Default Judgment which 
prevented Sean from participating in the trial and allegedly 
resulted in Aetna putting on its impotent case. While issues of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel will have to be resolved at a 
different time, the jury's finding is the jury's finding and it 
found "from a preponderance of the evidence that [Sean] was [not] 
negligent." 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order are 
consistent with the facts and the findings of this Court and should 
be signed as submitted. 
DATED THIS f U day of November, 1994. 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Sean Anastasion 
BY: Steven B. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 1994, 
true and correct copies of Sean's Response to Aetna's Objections to 
3 
the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were 
deposited in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to 
the following: 
Kelly R. Sheffield 
1364 Emigration 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Blake S. Atkin 
50 South Main Street, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Kchuy, ^Jptd C ^ ^ 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLRED, MERLE LEE 
VS 
ANASTATION, ANNA 





CASE NUMBER 910906462 PI 
DATE 06/15/93 
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R HANSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK EVT 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
P. ATTY. SHEFFIELD, KELLY, BLAKE ATKIN 
D. ATTY. SMITH, STEVEN B 
PER TELEPHONE CONFERENCE, 
1. DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL IS TO FILE ANY MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
ETNA INSURANCE FROM PARTICIPATION IN TRIAL WITHIN 15 DAYS. 
\2. PLAINTIFF HAS 10 DAYS TO FILE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
AGAINST DEFENDANT, SEAN ANASTATION IF HE HAS BEEN SERVED. IF HE 
HAS NOT BEEN SERVED, COUNSEL IS TO SERVE HIM. 
3. REGARDING QUESTION RAISED BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO 
AMEND THE COMPLAINT, THE COURT WILL NOT ALLOW ANY FURTHER 
AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPLAINT. 
EXHIBIT "B" 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERLE LEE ALLRED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANNE ANASTASION, et al., 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CASE NO. 910906462 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of 
the evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of 
the issue presented, then answer "yes." If you find the evidence 
is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of 
the evidence, or if you find that the evidence preponderates* 
against the issue presented, answer "no." Also, any damages 
assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
1. Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Anne 
Anastasion, was negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No ^ 
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "yes," please answer 
Question No. 2. 
-2-
2. Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the 
defendant, Anne Anastasion, was either the sole proximate cause or 
a contributing proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No @ > 
3. Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Sean 
Anastasion, was negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No A 
If your answer to Question No. 3 is "yes," please answer 
Question No. 4. 
4. Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the 
defendant, Shawn Anastasion, was either the sole proximate cause or 
a contributing proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you have answered Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 all "no," or 
were not required to answer Question 2 or 4, you need not go 
further in answering additional questions. Please sign the verdict 
form and notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to the 
courtroom. If you have found negligence on the part of either or 
both of the defendants, and that negligence was a proximate cause 
of the plaintiff's injuries, then please proceed to the next 
question. 
-3-
5. Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff, Merle Allred, 
was negligent? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If your answer to Question No* 5 is "yes/1 please answer 
Question No. 6. 
6. Considering all the evidence in this case, do you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence of the 
plaintiff, Merle Allred, was either the sole proximate cause or a 
contributing proximate cause of her own injuries? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
!• Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total 
100%, what percentage of fault is attributable to: 
A. Defendant Anne Anastasion % 
B. Defendant Sean Anastasion % 
C. Plaintiff Merle Allred % 
TOTAL 100 % 
8. Please state the amount of special and general damages, 
if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the 
plaintiff's injuries. 
Special Damages 
(a) medical expenses to date of trial $ 
(b) future medical expenses $ 
-4-
General Damages (pain & suffering) 
TOTAL 
Dated this f dav of Fe^ruaryr 
$ . 
FOREPERSON 
'fe/OT L OU><2 
